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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The history and development of Azerbaijan1 is intimately tied to its relations 
with its great neighbours and, since the middle of last century, with the 
development of its major resource: oil. The advent of Russian involvement in 
the Caucasus with the Persian Expedition of 1722 marked the beginning of 
military conflict and competition between the Russian, Persian and Ottoman 
empires in the region. Historical Azerbaijan, squeezed between these great 
powers and their successor states, was partitioned along the Araxes river 
between the Russian and Persian empires following the Treaty of Turkmenchai 
in 1828,2 while the western boundary between the Russian and Ottoman 
empires was established by the Treaty of Adrianople in 1829.3 
 
Since then, modern Azerbaijan has seen a clutch of invasions, autonomist 
rebellions, re-invasions and occupations by Russian, Persian, Ottoman, and 
even British troops, a brief period of independence from 1918 to 1920, seizure 
by the Red Army, followed by seventy years of Communist rule and, after 
1991, a shaky independence interspersed with a number of coups d’etat. 
 
Compounding its geopolitical importance as a borderland, or a meeting place of 
Russian, Turkic and Persian civilisations, has been the presence of oil. The 
very name "Azerbaijan" is popularly (but perhaps incorrectly) thought to 
originate from the Persian word azer, meaning "fire"; Azerbaijan being the 
"land of fires" due the fires of numerous Zoroastrian temples fed by the 
                                                          
1 For ease, the term Azerbaijan will be used to refer to the territory occupied by the 
modern state of the Republic of Azerbaijan and not, as is sometimes the case, to a 
territory including the mainly Azeri-populated Iranian provinces of East and West 
Azerbaijan and what Azeris from the Republic refer to as 'southern Azerbaijan'. When 
referring to this area, or to the two territories combined, specific reference will be 
made. 
2 M. H. Ganji, "The Historical Boundaries of Azerbaijan," in K. McLachlin (ed.), The 
Boundaries of Modern Iran, (London: UCL Press, 1994), pp. 37-46. 
3 T. Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan, 1905-1920: The Shaping of National Identity 
in a Muslim Community, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 7. 
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plentiful oil.4 The Apsiton peninsula, site of the present day capital, Baku, was 
one of the most sacred Zoroastrian sites.5 It was fitting then, that the world's 
first mechanical oil well was drilled there in 1847.6 One Azeri observer recalled 
in 1899: 
 
Then, in the rocky fields around Baku, oil fountains shot high up, and all 
watched with fascination these marvellous phenomena of nature. As the 
owners of the fountains were quickly piling up their millions, capitals 
and expertise began to flow in from everywhere, what used to be in 
effect the place of administrative exile, now began to bubble with life.7 
 
During this first oil boom Azerbaijan remained firmly under Russian control 
with the ownership of these wells increasingly falling into Russian, Western 
and Armenian hands.8 With the advent of the Soviet Union, the oil industry in 
Azerbaijan slipped into a slow but inexorable decline as the result of over-
exploitation and under-investment. 
 
Following World War II the focus of Soviet oil extraction moved away from 
the Caspian Sea to the Volga and Ural regions, and then in the 1960s towards 
the vast new Siberian oilfields, making the USSR the world's largest oil 
producer. But Azerbaijan, by the 1980s, produced a meagre 3 per cent of the 
Soviet total.9 
 
In terms of attracting investment, Azerbaijan faired worse than most, receiving 
61 per cent of the Union republics' average level of investment between 1960 
and 1978, while its neighbours Georgia and Armenia received 64 per cent 78 
per cent of this amount.10 Moreover, the Muslim republics of the USSR, and 
                                                          
4 T. Swietochowski, Russia and Azerbaijan, a Borderland in Transition, (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1995), pp. 1. 
5 N. Aliyev, "The History of Oil in Azerbaijan," Azerbaijan International, vol. 2, no. 2, 
Spring 1994, pp. 22. 
6 Ibid., pp. 23.  
7 Hasan Bey Zardarbi, Kaspiy, 212, (1899), quoted in T. Swietochowski, op. cit., (1995), 
pp. 19. 
8 Ibid., pp. 22. 
9 Ibid., pp. 179. 
10 T. Swietochowski, op. cit., (1995), pp. 179-80. 
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Azerbaijan in particular, lagged behind general Soviet living standards, with 
per capita income in Azerbaijan 68 per cent the Union average in 1970, 
compared with 81 per cent in Turkmenistan for example and 104 per cent for 
the non-Muslin republics.11 
 
Perhaps most damaging of all, however, was arbitrary Soviet system of price 
fixing. This meant that prices for most major commodities were set by central 
government, over which the producers and individual republics could exert 
little control. Oil was thus sold to the state at well below world market prices. 
At the end of the Soviet period, the sums involved had reached comic 
proportions. At the beginning of 1991, the price paid by the state for Azeri oil 
was increased to 120 roubles/tonne, meanwhile the cost of producing this oil 
stood at over 130 roubles. What is more, this same 120 roubles at 
contemporary prices was sufficient to buy only four kilos of meat, or one pair 
of shoes!12 As a result, Soviet policy led to the depletion of natural resources 
with little reference, and even less benefit, to the producer republics. But, by 
the same token, the lack of investment left substantial energy reserves either 
untapped or even unexplored within the Caspian region. 
 
In addition, Azerbaijan's population was increasing faster than in the 
neighbouring republics. During the decade 1979-89, Azerbaijan's population 
increased by about twice that of its immediate neighbours - by 16.5 per cent 
compared with 8.8 per cent for Armenia and 8.1 per cent for Georgia, both of 
which were higher than Russia whose rate was 7 per cent. The number of 
Azeris in Azerbaijan, however, increased by 23.2 per cent, the overall 
population growth figures being kept down by the substantial emigration of 
minority groups especially Armenians, but also Russians and Jews.13 Azeris 
became only slightly more dominant in their titular republic during this period, 
rising from 78 per cent of the population in 1979 to 82 per cent in 1989. 
Significantly though, areas within Azerbaijan became more ethnically 
homogeneous, while the numbers of Armenians in Azerbaijan as a whole fell 
by 17.9 per cent, they fell by a massive 47.2 per cent in the autonomous oblast 
                                                          
11 A. McAuIey, "The Soviet Muslim Population: Trends in Living Standards, 1960-75," 
in Y. Ro'i (ed.), The USSR and the Muslim World, (London: Allen & Unwin, 1984), 
pp. 99. 
12 Azerbaycan Gençleri Gazetisi, Baku, quoted in Y. Asian, Azerbaycan, Tam 
Bagimsizlik Yolunda, (Ankara), pp. 74. 
13 P.B. Henze, "The Demography of the Caucasus According to 1989 Soviet Census 
Data," Central Asian Survey, vol. 10, no. 1-2, 1991, pp. 148-50. 
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of Nakhichevan, but actually grew by 18.2 per cent in Nagorno-Karabagh.14 
These figures do not, of course, take into account any of the massive 
movements of population which have taken place since 1989 onwards with the 
escalation of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabagh.  
 
At the end of 1991 then, Azerbaijan found itself thrust onto the international 
arena as an independent country for the second time in its history, and again 
subject to the same pressures from neighbouring states resulting from its 
geopolitical position at the cross-roads of Europe and Asia, Russia and the 
Middle East. Again Azerbaijan's position, astride potentially huge oil reserves, 
has served to render it an added importance, not only for its neighbours who, 
by controlling transportation routes, can earn valuable transit fees, as well as 
exert considerable leverage upon it, but also for nations further afield with their 
"capitals and expertise", which might benefit both as customers, producers and 
processors of this potential wealth. 
 
Azerbaijan is thus once again the centre of much attention both from regional 
and world players in the international arena, and the energy resources which it 
currently commands are of particular significance in determining the future 
direction of these relations. The aim of this paper is to render an account of 
these relations so far and to give some idea of their likely future direction. To 
do this, I shall start by charting the development of Azerbaijan since 
independence, giving some idea of the factors which weigh upon the domestic 
political agenda and showing how the presence of oil has already had a major 
effect on domestic political events.  
 
In order to assess the likely future effects of the presence of oil, some account 
must be given of the magnitude of these energy reserves and their potential. 
This will be done in Part Two. The next Part will deal with the major obstacles 
to development of Azerbaijan’s oil reserves in the light of the international 
ramifications. In particular I shall examine the controversy over the status of 
the Caspian Sea, then the question of pipeline routes. To sum up, I shall then 
draw these factors together, giving an assessment of their likely impact on 
Azerbaijan's relations, in particular with its major neighbours, namely Russia, 
Turkey and Iran. 
 
                                                          
14 Ibid., pp. 150. 
 
 
? ? CMEIS 58 
 
 
 
 5 
 
? ? 
 
  
 
 
 
 
PART ONE 
AZERBAIJAN ON THE ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE 
 
 
In order to assess the impact of the regeneration of Azerbaijan's oil industry, it 
is necessary to have some understanding of the processes leading up to that 
development and of the major trends in Azeri politics since the break-up of the 
Soviet Union. 
 
The most important objective throughout recent Azerbaijani history and policy 
has been to achieve greater independence. Even before the USSR had officially 
ceased to exist on 31 December 1991, the former Azeri leader, Ayaz 
Mutalibov, had visited Ankara, establishing bilateral links with the outside 
world for the first time in the modern era.15 
 
During this period of "restructuring", or perestroika, "the first mass resistance 
that could not be contained within the metamorphosing Soviet system, the 
crisis that precipitated the unravelling of central Soviet authority, came from an 
Armenian enclave in the republic of Azerbaijan."16 
 
The hostilities which erupted in Nagorno-Karabagh in 1988 set a precedent for 
other ethno-nationalist struggles elsewhere which were ultimately to be the 
undoing of the Soviet Union. This particular conflict was also central to the 
formation of the Republic of Azerbaijan. Since, to this day, there has never 
been any real solution to the dispute, it has had an enormous impact, not only 
on internal politics, but in determining relations with neighbouring states and 
powers. Moreover, it has also had a major effect on decisions concerning the 
exploitation of Azerbaijan's mineral wealth.  
 
The need for funds to help to deal with the effects of the war (such as displaced 
persons and damaged infrastructure), plus the need to restore stability, as well 
                                                          
15 A. Vassiliev, "Turkey and Iran in Caucasian Central Asia," in A. Ehteshami (ed.), 
From the Gulf to Central Asia: Players in the New Great Game, (Exeter: University 
of Exeter Press, 1994), pp. 139. 
16 R.G. Suny, Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution and the Collapse of the 
Soviet Union, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), pp. 132. 
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as the desire to re-arm in order to prosecute the war more effectively, have 
given added urgency to decisions on the future development of Azerbaijan's oil 
reserves, on the award of contracts to oil companies and on the choice of routes 
for transporting the oil. However, there are two sides to this development. As 
will be seen below, the presence of oil in the region may also have a potential 
for encouraging peace. Peace and concomitant stability in Azerbaijan have, 
however, so far been hard to achieve. The already low standards of living, 
together with the familiar crippling consequences of the transformation from a 
centralised to a market economy, added to the effects of a brutal civil war 
which produced over one million internal refugees, has led to extreme 
economic dislocation.17 According to the IMF, the Azerbaijan economy since 
the late 1980s, has: 
 
experienced severe external shocks. These included the break-up of the 
USSR and the associated disruptions in trade and financial links, the 
conflict over Nagorno-Karabagh, and the deterioration of Azerbaijan’s 
terms of trade as prices of natural gas and other imports rose to world 
market levels and transportation costs rose due to closure of trade 
routes through Georgia and Chechnya. The resulting decline - real 
GDP fell by about 60 per cent in 1990-94 - has been among the largest 
in the transition economies.18 
 
Added to this, government financial policies, "largely inconsistent with 
achieving economic stability", combined to produce consumer price increases 
of 1,800 per cent in 1994 and monthly inflation in excess of 50 per cent at the 
end of that year.19 Such economic collapse was not only a product of the 
upheavals in Azerbaijan but was also a factor which reinforced and entrenched 
existing economic and political problems. 
 
This turmoil, which began with the eruption of the Nagorno-Karabagh dispute 
in February 1988 (well before the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991), not 
only preceded similar events elsewhere but, since the dispute has yet to be fully 
resolved, has also been more sustained. Events in Azerbaijan have also been 
exceptional in a number of other respects. There were large demonstrations in 
Baku throughout 1988 and in August of that year the only genuine mass 
                                                          
17 The Times, 14 December 1994. See also Humanitarian Assistance in the Republic of 
Azerbaijan, Save the Children Report, Azerbaijan Field Office, Baku, March 1996. 
18 IMF Survey, 15 April 1996. 
19 Ibid. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 8 < Hemming > 
opposition group in the Muslim republics of the Soviet Union, the Azerbaycan 
Halk Cephesi (Peoples' Front of Azerbaijan, PFA), was formed. Further 
demonstrations broke out at the end of 1989 along the Iranian border; border 
fencing was pulled down in protest at the ban on Azeris visiting relatives and 
graves on the other side. There were also calls for unification of both 
Azerbaijans.20 This was followed by attacks on Armenians in Baku and 
excesses were committed by both communities throughout the country. It 
culminated in a confrontation between the PFA and Soviet forces trying to 
wrest back power in the capital, resulting in the deaths of 168 civilians with 
another 400 missing.21 
 
After the failed Moscow coup d'etat of 19 August 1991, Azerbaijan became the 
first of the USSR's Muslim republics to declare independence, issuing the 
"Declaration on Restoring the State of Independence of the Republic of 
Azerbaijan" on 30 August 1991,22 and was first to be recognised by the outside 
world, initially by Turkey, on 9 November 1991.23 Despite Azeri president 
Ayaz Mutalibov's apparent nationalist leanings, his alleged initial endorsement 
of the communist-inspired 19 August coup, his hasty commitment to join the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and his clear pro-Russian 
sympathies, cost him much support. 
 
At the same time, however, in his home territory of Nakhichevan, where he had 
received 95 per cent of votes in the 1990 elections, Haydar Aliyev, ex-KGB 
and Brezhnev-era party boss, was forcing the pace of change by disbanding the 
local communist party and nationalising its property. Thus pressured to follow 
suit, on 14 September 1991, in its shortest-ever session, the Communist Party 
of Azerbaijan voted to disband itself.24 Despite this political manoeuvring, 
Mutalibov was unable to retain power and, as seems to be the fate of Azeri 
politicians, his "nemesis became the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict, the catalyst 
for the rise of the national movement, which was now becoming a time 
bomb."25 
                                                          
20 T. Swietochowski, op. cit., (1995), pp. 202-03. 
21 Ibid., pp. 205. 
22 J.M. Landau, Pan-Turkism, from Irredentism to Co-operation, (London: Hurst & Co., 
1995), pp. 197. 
23 Ibid., pp. 213. 
24 T. Swietochowski, op. cit., (1995), pp. 217. 
25 Ibid., pp. 218. 
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An Armenian offensive beginning at the end of January 1992, aimed at opening 
a corridor between Nagorno-Karabagh and Armenia through the town of 
Lachin and at capturing the town of Shusha, revealed the dismal state of Azeri 
forces. This was blamed on Mutalibov's failure to organise a national army 
which was still only 500 strong at this point.26 The final straw came as reports 
and pictures began to filter back of massacres committed by Armenian forces 
in the town of Khojali, where over 450 Azeri civilians were killed.27 Mutalibov 
was thus forced to resign on 6 March 1992. Yaqub Mamadov was to have 
remained provisional president pending elections, but when the town of Shusha 
fell to the Armenians, Mutalibov attempted a counter coup, leading to the 
removal of both of them. The election, on 7 June, from which Haydar Aliyev 
was barred due to an upper age limit set at sixty-five, was won by the chairman 
of the PFA, former dissident and Arabic scholar, Abdulfaz Elchibey. 
 
The new president, during his rule which lasted almost one year, attempted to 
open a new era for Azerbaijan. He began by promising closer links with 
Turkey and by vehemently denouncing Iran, accusing it of being a "totalitarian 
regime which covers itself in Islamic slogans,"28 and arousing Iranian 
sensitivities over its sizeable Azeri minority by suggesting that, "as an 
independent state rises in the north of Azerbaijan, it will make it easier for 
freedom to grow in the south."29 Almost immediately after this, Elchibey 
stepped up negotiations with foreign oil companies for the development of a 
number of large Caspian oilfields, promising that money earned from these 
resources would win the war with Armenia.30 On the other hand, in his fiefdom 
of Nakhichevan, Haydar Aliyev negotiated a deal with the Iranian government 
to receive food and energy supplies,31 and also managed to obtain a US$ 100 
million loan from Turkey for the hard pressed region.32 
 
                                                          
26 Times, 29 January 1992, 8 February 1992, and 15 March 1992. 
27 Ibid., 1 March 1992, and 2 March l992. 
28 Quoted in The Times, 9 June 1992. 
29 Azadliq, Baku, 19 July 1991, quoted in T. Swietochowski, op. cit., (1995), pp. 222. 
30 The Times, 30 June 1992. 
31 The Financial Times, 25 August 1992. 
32 T. Swietochowski, op. cit., (1995), pp. 215. 
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The Pan-Turkist sentiments of Elchibey, in contrast, were short on bringing 
concrete results.33 Even as President Özal of Turkey, who shared similar 
sympathies with Elchibey, was recommending Turkish military intervention in 
the conflict, the Turkish prime minister, Süleyman Demirel, was discounting all 
such possibilities.34 As Elchibey withdrew Azerbaijan from the CIS, Russia 
retaliated by raising import duties, causing massive inflation and further 
dislocation in the economy. Such moves also led Moscow to ease restrictions 
on the movement of arms and mercenaries into Armenia. Meanwhile, Turkey 
was beginning to realise the burdens that too close an alliance with Azerbaijan 
could bring - over-antagonising Russia was just too high a price. Neither were 
signs coming from America encouraging: a Congressional ruling (Title IX, 
Section 907 of the 1992 Freedom Support Act) prohibited, and still prohibits, 
assistance: 
 
to the Government of Azerbaijan until the President determines, and so 
reports to Congress, that the Government of Azerbaijan is taking 
demonstrable steps to cease all blockades and other offensive uses of 
force against Armenia and Nagorno-Karabagh.35 
 
Thus, while President Özal still spoke of a military alliance between Turkey 
and Azerbaijan on a visit to Baku on 14 April 1993, the idea died with him 
three days later.36 President Elchibey was also soon to depart to another place, 
though in his case it was to exile in Nakhichevan. Like his predecessor 
Mutalibov, lack of success, or indeed outright failure, in Nagorno-Karabagh 
proved to be his undoing. Despite efforts to reach a cease-fire, an Armenian 
offensive over the winter of 1993 resulted in further losses for the Azeri side in 
the conflict. A corridor from Armenia through Lachin was finally opened up, 
allowing further reinforcement of the Armenian forces in Nagorno-Karabagh. 
While Armenian troops were advancing on all fronts and with desertions 
amongst Azeri forces reportedly widespread, Baku was ineffectually adorned in 
FFA slogans stating "Nagorno-Karabagh will always be Azerbaijan", and 
"Defend the Motherland to the last drop of your blood", only these signs were 
                                                          
33 One of the few was the reinforcement of Turkey's border with Nakhichevan, which 
successfully deterred Armenian attacks on the province, The Times, 8 April 1993. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Quoted in USAID Country Profile: Azerbaijan, February 1995. Pressure from US oil 
companies has succeeded in opening loopholes in Section 907, allowing some US aid 
through to Azerbaijan, (Houston Chronicle, 26 September 1996). 
36 The Times, 15 April 1993. 
 
 
? ? CMEIS 58 
 
 
 
 11 
written in the recently adopted Latin script of Turkey, and so were 
unintelligible to all but a few people.37 
 
Elchibey then attempted to remove one of his own commanders, the 35-year-
old Suret Hüseynov, charging him with responsibility for the battlefield 
reverses. The former factory manager and reputed millionaire Hüseynov,38 
commanding a private army of some 3,000 troops, then moved against the 
government, taking over the second city, Ganja. After demanding that Russian 
troops which were still stationed in Ganja quit the city to avoid being caught up 
in the conflict, the government decided to take on the rebels on 4 June. When 
this also ended in humiliating defeat for the government and the loss of seventy 
lives, Hüseynov’s militia leisurely moved towards the capital, forcing the 
government to make concessions and Elchibey to flee.39 Portentously, Haydar 
Aliyev was now brought to Baku and elected speaker of the Milli Meclis 
(National Assembly) on 15 June, with presidential powers due to the absence 
of Elchibey. Aliyev appointed Hüseynov as head of the defence, interior and 
security ministries, and as prime minister and 'supreme commander' of the 
armed forces.40 
 
This coup coincided with what was to be the culmination of a large oil deal 
with a consortium of Western companies. Elchibey had been due to travel to 
London to sign the agreement on 2 July. Despite his forced departure instead to 
Nakhichevan on 18 June, the eight foreign companies involved (BP, Statoil, 
Amoco, Pennzoil, McDermott, Unocal, Ramco and TPAO), paid US$70 
million 'good faith money' to the government in order to continue 
negotiations.41 Less than a week later the new Azeri government responded by 
cancelling the deal and arguing for a re-negotiation on more favourable terms 
for the Azeri side. It also refused to return the money.42 
 
                                                          
37 Ibid., 14 April 1993. 
38 Reuters, 27 March 1997.  
39 The Financial Times, 17 June 1993. 
40 Ibid., 1 July 1993. 
41 Ibid., 23 June 1993. 
42 Ibid., 28 June 1993, and 13 August 1993. 
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Haydar Ali Rizaoglu Aliyev was born on 10 May 1923,43 although there does 
seem to be some doubt about this date. He did join the KGB in 1945, however, 
and rose to be its head in Azerbaijan in 1967. He became First Secretary of the 
Azerbaijani Communist Party in 1969 and was a member of Leonid Brezhnev's 
inner circle. He became a full member of the Soviet Politburo under Andropov 
in 1982 but was dismissed by Gorbachev in 1987 and branded a corrupt anti-
glasnost hard-liner.44 After charting a come-back from his native Nakhichevan, 
he consolidated his position with a referendum of no confidence in Elchibey on 
29 August and presidential elections on 3 October 1993.45 Although he insists 
that he "didn't want to be president" but that people "asked" him,46 Aliyev has 
proved to be a skilful and wily politician who has brought the stability required 
by the major oil companies and managed to balance the competing 
international forces that historically have threatened the republic. 
 
After successfully forcing the renegotiation of the oil contracts, Aliyev brought 
Azerbaijan back into the CIS, but without inviting back Russian troops. 
Relations with Iran improved greatly at the cost of ties with Turkey and 
politicians there were forced to take a more realistic view of their limited 
capabilities, especially in the face of renewed Russian interest in the region. 
One of Aliyev's first acts was to insist on the resignation of Sabit Bagirov, the 
head of the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) who had 
negotiated the previous oil contract which Elchibey was to have signed in 
London. He was replaced with a little known geologist, Natik Aliyev (no 
relation), who was stripped of decision-making powers which were transferred 
to parliament, now firmly under Haydar Aliyev' 5 control.47 By November an 
'agreement in principle' with the BP-led consortium had been reached and a 
further US$250 million gained as a signature bonus, with another US$250 
million to be paid upon the finalisation of an export-pipeline agreement.48 
 
                                                          
43 A.L. Altstadt, The Azerbaijani Turks: Power and Identity under Russian Rule, 
(Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1992), pp. 177. 
44 L. Chorbajian, P. Donabedian, and C. Mutafian, The Caucasian Knot, the History and 
Geopolitics of Nagorno-Karabagh, (London & New York: Zed Books, 1994), pp. 17. 
45 T. Swietochowski, op. cit., (1995), pp. 225. 
46 Quoted in B. Blair, "Interview with President Haydar Aliyev," Azerbaijan 
International, vol. 2, no. 2, 1994. 
47 The Financial Times, 13 August 1993. 
48 Ibid., 2 November 1993. 
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In the new year of 1994, the partly state-owned Russian oil company Lukoil49 
started to be mentioned as a possible partner in the deal. This coincided with 
renewed Russian efforts to secure peace in the conflict in Nagorno-Karabagh. 
The Armenian forces had taken advantage of the turmoil of the coup to make 
major advances, taking the last Azeri-held towns in the Karabagh as well as the 
towns of Agdam, Cebrayil and Fizuli in Azerbaijan proper. After peace efforts 
in the autumn also failed, a surprise attack was launched by the Azeris in 
October, reportedly spearheaded by some 1,000 mujahideen from Afghanistan, 
but to no avail. In December a new offensive was launched, resulting in heavy 
casualties, but few gains.50 At the end of this last effort to secure a military 
solution to the conflict, Aliyev visited Ankara, Paris and London to put forward 
the Azeri case on Nagorno-Karabagh. He also speeded up negotiations with the 
companies of the nascent oil consortium by handing responsibility for 
negotiations from parliament back to SOCAR. Just as this occurred, a Russian-
brokered cease-fire was announced which, although broken on numerous 
occasions, was at least the beginning of the end of widescale hostilities.51 
 
Thus on 20 September 1994 the so-called "contract of the century", was signed. 
The thirty-year US$8,000 million contract between Azerbaijan, represented by 
SOCAR, and a consortium of ten foreign companies to develop the Azeri, 
Chirag and Güneshli (ACG) oilfields was a major landmark in the development 
of Azerbaijan. The companies included Amoco, Unocal, McDermott and 
Pennzoil of the US, BP and Ramco of the UK, Statoil of Norway, Lukoil of 
Russia, TPAO of Turkey and Delta of Saudi Arabia (see Appendix 1). The 
signing of such an agreement with these major corporations installed 
confidence in smaller companies, both in the oil industry and outside it, 
increasing their willingness to make investments in Azerbaijan. The presence in 
the consortium of such major companies, from such diverse countries of origin, 
gave each of those countries a vested interest in the future of Azerbaijan, thus 
forming a firmer basis for stability and offering a safer guarantee for continued 
independence. "Azerbaijan has no lobby in any Western country. But when the 
oil agreement is signed, it will have economic relations with these countries," 
predicted Leyla Yunusova, a former deputy defence minister.52 Aliyev also 
gained a more ready access to world leaders; days after the signing he was in 
America to address the UN general assembly. 
                                                          
49 The government of the Russian Federation holds 38.58 per cent of Lukoil shares. 
50 The Financial Times, 7 March 1994. 
51 Ibid., 21 February 1994 and 22 February 1994. 
52 Quoted in Ibid., 7 March 1994. 
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He also met US president Bill Clinton to discuss the implications of the oil deal 
and to put forward Azerbaijan's view of the hostilities in Nagorno-Karabagh, 
after which he stated, "I'm very confident, now more than ever, that Azerbaijan 
is closer to achieving a peaceful resolution of the conflict with Armenia.53 
 
The day after the signing of the oil contract, however, four high-ranking 
prisoners, including the former defence minister, Rahim Gaziyev (who later 
turned up in Moscow), escaped from custody in the security ministry; noting 
the timing of this event, Haydar Aliyev remarked, "I don't think it is pure 
coincidence."54 Then, on the same day that Aliyev was giving his speech at the 
UN, two of his close allies, his security chief, Shemsi Rahimev, and the deputy 
parliamentary chairman, Afiyeddin Jelilev, were murdered. When three 
members of OMON, the interior ministry troops, were arrested for the killings, 
OMON troops took the general prosecutor, Ali Umarov, hostage and demanded 
the release of their colleagues.55 Other OMON units took control of the airport 
and administrative buildings in Ganja and there was also a grenade attack on a 
crowded market in Baku in which 20 people were injured. Aliyev, now 
returned, declared a state of emergency and called for popular demonstrations 
of support in which over 20,000 people participated.56 Despite their 
declarations of support for the existing government, both Roshvan Javadov, the 
interior minister, and Suret Hüseynov, the prime minister and erstwhile coup 
leader, were dismissed from office, slipping quietly into exile with Russian 
assistance amidst accusations that the coup was inspired with backing from 
Russia.
57
 
 
                                                          
53 Quoted in B. Blair, "President Haydar Aliyev and the Oil Contract of the Century," 
Azerbaijan International, vol. 2, no. 4, Autumn 1994. 
54 Quoted in C. H. Fairbanks, and E. Alekberov (eds.), "Azerbaijan and the Ominous 
Rumblings over Russia's 'Near Abroad'," Azerbaijan International, vol. 2, no. 4, 
Autumn 1994. 
55 T. Swietochowski, op. cit., (1995), pp. 227; The Financial Times, 3 October 1994, and 
4 October 1994. 
56 The Times, 5 October 1994, and 6 October 1994. 
57 Briefing, 10 October 1994; R.V. Barylski, "Russia, the West, and the Caspian Energy 
Hub," Middle East Journal, Spring 1995, pp. 223-4. Hüseynov was extradited back to 
Baku at a time of improving Russian-Azeri relations in March 1997 to face charges of 
treason and armed rebellion and a possible death penalty, (Reuters, 27 March 1997). 
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Haydar Aliyev thus succeeded in largely overcoming opposition and removing 
the major obstacles to Azerbaijan's development. The best hope for 
development, as well as the best chance of achieving some relief from the 
effects of a disastrous war, hinged on oil. Oil resources could not be developed 
without stability, while stability could not be achieved while the war raged 
(especially with its appetite for devouring Azeri leaders). But the war could not 
be stopped while Russia remained excluded from all influence (the same could 
be said for Iran, though to a lesser extent). Bringing Russia into the 
conundrum, by giving it a stake in Azerbaijan's development, gave it an interest 
in halting the war in the Karabagh. 
 
Still the major power in the region, Russia could then put pressure on Armenia, 
gain at least a temporary halt to hostilities and open the way for the oil deals 
that held the key to Azerbaijan's future. Achieving independence was more a 
matter of ensuring interdependence than it was of remaining aloof from 
historically important neighbouring nations. Aliyev's success was in 
recognising this fact. "What should we do?", he said at the time, "Should we 
simply continue to annoy it (Russia)? She is a great power and will continue to 
be. She has been involved in the fate of Azerbaijan for over two centuries. She 
must be at the centre of our policies."58 
 
 
? ? 
 
 
                                                          
58 Quoted in The Financial Times, 7 March 1994. 
  
 
 
 
 
PART TWO 
THE OIL 
 
 
Oil in Azerbaijan 
 
The presence of oil in Azerbaijan has thus been one of the major determining 
factors in its lost recent history. But in order to establish the true implications 
of its presence in terms of Azerbaijan's relations with its most important 
international partners, we must first establish the nature and extent of these 
reserves and assess the character and magnitude of the major obstacles to oil 
extraction, export and sale. It has been claimed that: 
 
the Soviet regime deliberately prevented the Caspian region's energy 
resources from being developed, ... deprived Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan 
and Turkmenistan of the opportunity to reach for higher living 
standards; ... gave priority to oil and gas fields inside the Russian 
Federation, directed new capital into Russia's western Siberian fields, 
and built pipelines that linked them to Western markets.59 
 
This shift in production was as much tied to technological considerations as it 
was to political reasoning. As the onshore fields became increasingly depleted, 
the remaining Caspian Sea oil deposits lay in deep water, difficult to extract 
due to lack of technological sophistication,60 and thus more problematic than 
the deposits lying underground in Siberia. Similarly, by the late 1980s, more 
than 70 per cent of wells in Azerbaijan had been in use for more than thirty 
years and so were in desperate need of restoration. Short of investment capital, 
the Soviet Union displayed a disposition for directing available capital away 
from the Caspian basin. During the last three "five-year plans", not a single 
Azeri oil well was discovered and put into service.61 Thus, oil production in 
Azerbaijan fell steadily from 14.7 million tonnes per year in 1980 to 11 million 
                                                          
59 R.V. Barylski, op. cit., pp. 128. 
60 M.J. Sagers, "The Energy Industries of the Former USSR: A Mid-year Survey," Post-
Soviet Geography, vol. 34, no. 6, 1993, pp. 344. 
61 Halk Gazetisi, Baku, 30 August 1991, quoted in Y. Asian, op. cit., pp. 75. 
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tonnes in 1992.62 At the time, the director of Azerbaijan's state oil company, 
SOCAR, stated that he expected oil production to level out in 1993 and begin 
to rise again from thereon.63 In fact, oil production was only beginning to level 
out in 1996, with 9.1 million tonnes produced in the year, compared with 9.16 
million tonnes in 1995.64 
 
Despite these figures most observers remain optimistic. The onshore deposits in 
Azerbaijan, including some of the oldest oilfields in the world on the Apsiton 
peninsula, may still contain substantial quantities of oil. According to one 
report, this may even amount to as much as 40 per cent of their original 
reserves.65 Such deposits, analysts argue, are being under-exploited due to 
outdated machinery and lack of equipment, rather than depletion of reserves. 
To this end, a number of agreements have been signed with foreign contractors 
for the renewal and rehabilitation of these existing onshore fields. These 
include: the Turkish companies Atilla Dogan Petrosan and Türkiye Petrolleri 
Anonim Ortakligi (TFAO) which are working on oilfields in the south-west 
and north-west of the republic respectively; Texaco which has signed a 
protocol of understanding to explore older fields in the lower Kura valley near 
the border with Georgia,66 and the British company Ramco which has proposed 
a joint development of the Muradkhanli onshore field, discovered in 1974 but 
whose production then soon fell off due to technical difficulties.67 
 
By far the largest energy reserves are to be found offshore, however, 
accounting for about 80 per cent of Azeri production. The Caspian basin as a 
whole already has proven oil reserves of 27,500 million barrels and the 
potential to yield 40-60,000 million barrels.68 As has already been noted, large 
areas of the Caspian Sea have yet to be properly surveyed for oil. For financial, 
as well as political, reasons the Caspian littoral states most eager to develop 
                                                          
62 M.J. Sagers, op. cit., pp. 344. 
63 Interfax News Report, 12-19 February 1993, pp. 12. 
64 Reuters, 6 January 1997. 
65 BBC SWB/SU, 19 February 1993, pp. 13. 
66 M.J. Sagers, op. cit., pp. 344, The Financial Times, 5 February 1993. 
67 N. Aliyev, "Oil Development in Azerbaijan Since Last Year's Oil Exhibition," 
Azerbaijan International, vol. 4, no. 2, Spring 1996. 
68 T.D. Adams, "Political Stability: The Key to Caspian Exports," Petroleum Economist, 
September 1996, pp. 44. This compares with Kuwait's proven oil reserves of 97,000 
million barrels, The Economist, 15 February 1997. 
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these reserves have been Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. Of the other states 
bordering the Caspian Sea, Iran has large oil reserves elsewhere, and has yet 
shown little interest in the immediate development of its Caspian energy 
reserves; similarly Russia is presently prioritising its West Siberian fields and 
has made only the most tentative steps towards oil exploration in its section of 
the Caspian basin. The technical difficulties of extracting Caspian oil mean that 
foreign expertise and financial investment will continue to be necessary for the 
foreseeable future, a fact concerning which both Iran and Russia, each for their 
own reasons, have certain reservations. Turkmenistan, for its part, is more 
concerned to develop its substantial natural gas reserves while avoiding 
dependence on outside help. Although there are plans to explore the Turkmen 
sector of the Caspian Sea for oil,69 the Turkmen government is anxious that the 
row over the sea's status be cleared up before any deals can be reached.70 
 
For both Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, however, probably the biggest export 
potential comes from their hydrocarbon energy reserves and both have been 
keen to develop this resource. To this end, both have followed similar paths. 
The Kazakhstancaspiishelf consortium, which includes seven Western 
companies and the Kazakh state oil company, has contracted to develop energy 
reserves in the Kazakh sector of the Caspian Sea. After recently completing a 
US$200 million seismic survey of the area though, the consortium refused to 
confirm whether earlier estimates of 10,000 million tonnes of oil reserves were 
accurate.71 
 
In the Azeri sector of the sea, the only accurate figures for the quantities of oil 
present come from the fields already being worked by the Azerbaijan 
International Operating Company (AIOC) consortium of companies (see 
Appendix 1). According to figures available from these sources, proven 
reserves in the ACG contract area amount to 4,000 million barrels of oil.72 The 
Shah Deniz block, meanwhile, is said to contain approximately 200 million 
tonnes of oil (1,500 million barrels) plus natural gas condensate;73 the 
                                                          
69 A. Akimov, "Oil and Gas in the Caspian Sea Region: An Overview of Co-operation 
and Conflict," Centre for Post Soviet Studies, Occasional Paper, 11 June 1996, pp. 3; 
BBC SWB/SU, 7 June 1996. 
70 Reuters, 12 March 1997. 
71 New Europe, 18-24 August 1996, pp. 43. 
72 T.D. Adams, op. cit., pp. 44; Daily Petroleum Monitor, 17 February 1997. 
73 The Financial Times, 5 June 1996. 
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Lenkoran Deniz project is estimated to contain 40 million tonnes of oil (300 
million barrels),74 while the Karabagh and Inam fields are each thought to 
contain more than 1,000 million barrels.75 These amounts are still only 
estimates of the amount of oil present; actual amounts could be lower or even 
exceed the figures mentioned. 
 
The ACG contract was to refurbish and extend a previously existing field. Shah 
Deniz, meanwhile, is an "unexplored structure",76 the contract for which is for 
"exploration and development"77 of the field; the Karabagh contract similarly 
specifies a three-year exploratory period, to be followed by development and 
production, "should oil be found".78 The prospect that oil and/or gas might not 
be found in these fields, however, is slight. In the words of AIOC president 
Terry Adams, "exploration risk is low", and while the Soviets faced certain 
technical problems in order to develop these fields, for AIOC this requires 
"only conventional technology".79 
 
The first of the major oil extraction projects to come on stream will be the ACG 
fields run by AIOC. The first phase of the AIOC programme involves offshore 
field appraisal (confirmation of available reserves, plus geotechnical, seabed 
and environmental surveys), refitting and constructing offshore production 
facilities and, thirdly, the "reactivation of existing export infrastructure to take 
ACG early oil to the Black Sea."80 This first phase is to be completed by the 
third quarter of 1997. "Early oil" is the term used to refer to the first amounts of 
oil to be produced from the existing and soon to be completed oil platforms 
which will generate the initial return on the companies' investment in the first 
years of field development. The amount of early oil is envisaged to rise 
gradually to a potential capacity of 210,000 barrels a day (b/d). Once the main 
oil comes on stream, this could rise to as much as 700,000 b/d.81 Before any of 
                                                          
74 Turan News Agency Report, Baku, 24 May 1996; BBC SWB/SU, 31 May 1996. 
75 Reuters, 10 June 1996; Interfax, 12 January 1997. 
76 Foreign Economic Relations, (Baku: Sharg INA, 1996), pp. 18. 
77 Ibid., pp. 17. 
78 Interview and correspondence with senior Agip official, Baku, 30 July and 8 
September 1996. 
79 T.D. Adams, op. cit., pp. 44. 
80 Ibid., pp. 45. 
81 Ibid., The Financial Times, 21 September 1994. 
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this potential can be realised, however, there are a number of geopolitical 
problems to be overcome. 
 
The Status of the Caspian Sea 
 
One of the problems which has impeded the development of the oilfields in 
Azerbaijan has been the uncertain status of the Caspian Sea. In recent years the 
question of the status of the Caspian Sea has gained an added importance. 
Whether it is in fact a sea, or in reality a giant lake, was, until the break-up of 
the Soviet Union, a largely abstract question. Since then, the independence of 
three new states bordering the Caspian has thrown into doubt existing treaties 
concerning its status which were agreed essentially between two states, Iran 
and Russia (later the USSR). 
 
In particular, the issue of the right to extract the sea’s mineral resources has 
been the greatest bone of contention, involving matters fundamental to the 
national sovereignty and future development of the newly independent littoral 
states, and also key issues for Russia in its unfolding relations with its former 
attendant republics. But on closer examination, the very insolubility of this 
question in itself provides, as long as each state is prepared to stick by the 
rules, the basis of a practical modus vivendi for all the Caspian riparian states. 
 
The Caspian Sea is an enclosed body of salt water approximately 700 miles 
north to south and 250 miles east to west, With a maximum depth of 1,025 
metres and an average water volume of 80,000 km3 it is the world's largest 
inland body of water.82 It is bordered by Iran to the south, Azerbaijan to the 
west, Turkmenistan to the east, Kazakhstan to the north and east and Russia to 
the north and west. As well as the oil reserves already discussed, there are also 
important fisheries resources, including the beluga sturgeon whose roe is used 
for caviar. Besides the jurisdictional problems over the right of extraction of its 
resources, there are connected environmental and military issues which are 
important when considering the Caspian's status. 
 
The first relevant treaty concerning the Caspian is the aforementioned Treaty of 
Turkmenchai of 1828 which delineated the Russian and Persian frontiers. The 
                                                          
82 F.M. Jafarov, Review of the Environmental Conditions Associated with the Chirag 
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treaty granted rights of passage to Russian and Iranian merchant ships on the 
Caspian Sea, but ceded the exclusive right to maintain a navy on these waters 
to Russia.83 
 
Subsequent treaties affecting the management of the Caspian Sea during the 
Soviet era were signed between the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic 
(RSFSR) and Iran in 1921,84 and between Iran and the USSR in 193585 and 
1940.86 The position stated in the 1935 treaty and repeated in 1940 was that 
both parties regarded the Caspian as "a Soviet and Iranian Sea" with exclusive 
control vested in the two governments.87 None of the treaties specifically refers 
to the division of territorial waters between the two states, however, nor is there 
any mention of the exploitation of the natural resources of the continental shelf. 
The only delineation of the Caspian of any kind was in provisions in the 1935 
and 1940 treaties according to which each state reserved the right to fish in 
coastal waters up to ten nautical miles from the shore, though this area was not 
defined as a territorial sea nor even as a fisheries zone.88 
 
Such ambiguities have been compounded by the break-up of the Soviet Union 
and the addition of the three new Caspian littoral states: Azerbaijan, 
Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan. With no established mechanism for governing 
the waters of the Caspian basin, the parties have appealed to both precedent 
and international law to justify their positions. 
 
The position held by these new states is that the Caspian ought to be considered 
an international sea, with sovereignty of its territorial waters extending to the 
sea bed and subsoil and also the resources thereof (plus the airspace above), as 
set out in the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous 
                                                          
83 A. Maleki, "Iran's Northeastern Borders, from Sarakhs to Khazar, (the Caspian Sea)," 
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Zone of 1958, and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 
1982.89 This would imply that littoral states would have full rights over 
territorial waters up to 12 nautical miles from the coast, the right to assert a 
contiguous zone up to 24 nautical miles and distinct rights, including the right 
to exploit mineral resources, within an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of 200 
miles and over the Continental Shelf beyond 12 miles.90 
 
Under international law there is also a good case for arguing that the same rules 
should also apply to inland seas: 
 
when the shores of a land-locked sea belong to two or more countries, 
and there is no agreement to the contrary fixing the limits of their 
respective boundaries, the sovereignty of each must be respected in the 
zone of its territorial waters, and the legal regime in the central part is 
then similar to that on the high seas.91 
 
Thus the riparian states of such an inland sea would have the same rights as 
they would if the sea were not enclosed. In either case, of the Caspian being 
seen as part of the high seas, or of it being judged to be an inland sea in which 
the international law of the sea should apply, similar methods of demarcation 
would be utilised. 
 
As EEZs of the Caspian coastal states would clearly overlap (the body of water 
being only 250 miles wide), agreement over the demarcation of such zones 
would need to be established. In these cases there are a number of methods of 
deciding the issue of the overlapping of EEZs. By far the most common 
method of deciding such boundaries, however, is by their being set equidistant 
from the opposing shores. Despite the 1982 UN Convention, making "vague 
delimitation formulae and references to an 'equitable solution'", that is a 
solution taking into account the various interests of the parties involved, the 
overwhelming majority of such cases, both before and after 1982, have been 
decided according to the principle of equidistance.92 Even if an "equitable 
                                                          
89 See H. Lauterpacht (ed.), Oppenheim's International Law, vol. 1, 1992, pp. 573. 
90 See E.D. Brown, Sea Red Energy and Minerals: The International Law Regime, 
(Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1992), pp. 9-13; G. Englefield, op. cit., pp. 31. 
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solution" were to be applied, according to an International Court of Justice 
ruling, "[i]n opposite state situations, where the distance between the two states 
does not exceed 400 miles, geological or geomorphological factors are 
irrelevant to the delimitation of the continental shelf."93 So even if an 
"equitable solution" were to be applied to the delimitation of the Caspian, the 
right of the younger Caspian states of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan to extract the sea's mineral resources should still be protected. 
 
If, however, the Caspian is considered to be a lake, its status is quite different. 
For lakes bordered by more than one state, international boundaries are 
normally established by agreement with the parties concerned and the 
international law of the sea does not apply.94 This is the view most frequently 
put forward by Russia, arguing that the Caspian "lake" is a "condominium" in 
which rights are shared by all the littoral states, and which cannot be exploited 
by any one of them without agreement from all. 
 
In other similar circumstances, the matter is often governed by special treaties, 
examples of which include those covering: Lake Constance which is bordered 
by Austria, Switzerland and Germany: Lake Geneva between Switzerland and 
France, and the lakes of Huron, Erie and Ontario which are divided between 
Canada and the US.95 
 
In all these cases, though, the agreement between the parties involved the 
partition of the whole area into territorial zones exclusively under the 
sovereignty of the relevant coastal state, although common regimes dealing 
with matters of mutual interest, such as environmental management, are often 
established. This exclusive division in nearly all cases has followed the 
principle of drawing a median line between the concerned states based on the 
length of coastline. This is the case in the 1816 treaty which divided Lake 
Geneva between Switzerland and Sardinia, the 1867 Treaty of Bregenz 
dividing Lake Constance and the various treaties between the US and Great 
Britain dividing the Great Lakes.96 Thus, even if the Caspian were considered 
to be a lake, precedence dictates that the division be undertaken according to 
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median lines and length of coastline. Such a judgement would also favour the 
position of the governments of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. 
 
The dispute over the Caspian, then, first of all concerns the issue of whether it 
is a sea connected to international waters, and thus subject to the Geneva 
Convention of 1958 and the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea. For an 
enclosed body of water to be considered part of the open sea, it must have a 
navigable salt water connection to the general body of salt water and this 
connection must be fully open to ships of all nations, regardless of whether this 
connection passes through the territory of one or more nations.97 Here the 
Black Sea is clearly a case in point, its sole connection to the high seas being 
through the Bosphorous and Dardanelles straits, both salt-water bodies which, 
despite being under the sovereignty of one country, Turkey, enjoy open 
navigation to all except military shipping, as guaranteed by the Convention of 
Montreux of 1936. The Caspian Sea is also connected to the high seas via the 
Volga and Don rivers and the Volga-Don canal. That these rivers, and the canal 
linking them, are clearly not saline, severely undermines the case for arguing 
that the Caspian forms a normal part of international waters, as does the 
limitation of its accessibility to international shipping due to restrictions on 
shipping imposed by the Russian government which controls the Volga-Don 
river system. 
 
The second issue, then, is what, if it is considered to be a lake or an inland sea, 
should be the mechanism for the division of its resources. Only in exceptional 
circumstances can the Russian view legally prevail and the Caspian be 
considered both as a lake and a lake to be governed by a special 
"condominium". Although for environmental reasons such a mutual regime 
would be desirable, common environmental policy does not preclude separate 
sovereign rights over mineral resources.98 Indeed precedence shows this to be 
by far the most frequent solution in such cases, with sectors divided into 
exclusive zones based on the principle of median lines. Despite there being a 
good case for arguing that the Caspian is indeed a lake, detachment from 
international waters need not necessarily impede the Caspian being regarded as 
a sea to be governed by the law of the sea and thus also similarly divided. Thus, 
according to international law and precedent, the Russian case appears to be the 
weaker, but Russia still possesses great economic and military influence and its 
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objections to the present extraction deals provide useful ammunition with 
which to gain further leverage over its smaller southern neighbours. 
 
In any case, the Russian government's policy on this issue has been marked by 
inconsistency: its apparent acceptance of Kazakhstan's appropriation of its 
portion of the Caspian for exclusive exploration by the Kazakhstancaspiisheif 
consortium of companies runs counter to its usual assertions concerning the 
sea's status.99 Likewise, on closer examination, Russian policy on this dispute 
seems to have been determined more by the exigencies of events and by the 
varying interests of different ministries than by a point of principle. Russian 
opposition to the joint exploration and extraction of Caspian energy reserves by 
Kazakhstan, but particularly by Azerbaijan and Western oil companies, was 
clear from the beginning. However, objections intensified as such deals were 
reaching fruition, then diminished until the next round of negotiations. Thus in 
February 1994, as Haydar Aliyev was visiting heads of state in Turkey, France 
and Britain to discuss the implementation of the first such large oil deal (the 
agreement over the ACG oilfields with the AIOC consortium led by BP), the 
Russian foreign ministry delivered a letter to the British embassy in Moscow. 
 
This letter warned that any possible agreement over the joint extraction of 
Caspian energy reserves between Azerbaijan and Western consortia could be 
invalidated due to the uncertain status of the Caspian Sea; it stated that the 
Caspian is: 
 
an object of joint use, within whose boundaries all issues of activities, 
including resource development, have to be resolved with the 
participation of all the Caspian countries ... any steps by whatever 
Caspian state, aimed at acquiring any kind of advantage with regard to 
the areas and resources of the Caspian Sea, run counter to the interests 
of the other Caspian states and cannot be recognised.100 
 
Such objections became especially intense immediately after the deal was 
signed on 20 September 1994 (it will also be remembered that there was a coup 
attempt at this time which many put down to Russian involvement). Andrei 
Kozyrev, the Russian foreign minister, repeated the Russian stance on the 
status of the Caspian, pointing to agreements signed during the Soviet era 
limiting exploitation, saying "no one has annulled them. The former Soviet 
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republics are the Soviet Union's legal heirs, while Russia is its main 
successor."101 Meanwhile contrary messages were emerging from the Russian 
energy ministry; Russian energy ministers were present during the signing of 
the 20 September accord which included a 10 per cent share by the partly state-
owned Russian oil company Lukoil. Speaking for Lukoil, Alexander Vasilenko 
said: 
 
we signed a statement of intent with the state oil company of Azerbaijan 
last September. There was an inter-government agreement between 
Russia and Azerbaijan signed last October, which Yuri Shafranik (the 
Russian energy minister) signed permitting an agreement between 
Lukoil and Azerbaijan, Lukoil always works within the bounds of the 
law, and that is how we intend to work now.102 
 
Acknowledging the differences between the interests involved, the energy 
ministry stated that these also extended to the various ministries "each of which 
could have its own position." So while the foreign ministry ominously warned 
that Russia, in order to assert its view, it would "undertake measures which 
will, in its opinion, be necessary,"103 against the other Caspian states, Shafranik 
at the energy ministry, declared that he considered "talk about the status of the 
Caspian unfounded."104 
 
Similarly, Iranian criticisms of the proposed Azeri regime for the development 
of Caspian resources came hard on the heels of their exclusion from the AIOC 
consortium. Having been awarded a 5 per cent share of AIOC in November 
1994,105 Iran was subsequently excluded from participation in the consortium, 
under pressure from the US government in early 1995.106 The Iranian foreign 
minister, Ali Akbar Velayati, was then reported to have declared that he no 
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longer recognised the legality of the consortium until all issues regarding the 
status of the Caspian Sea were resolved.107 After the distribution of the old 
Soviet Caspian fleet in April 1992, Iran is also reported to consider invalid the 
clause in the 1828 Treaty of Turkmenchai forbidding its own military presence 
on the Sea.108 While Abbas Maliki, Iran’s deputy foreign minister, added that 
"until there is a new legal regime, the old regime is in effect ... all the countries 
must compromise regarding a new regime."109 
 
However, there have also been conflicting messages emerging from Iran on the 
question of the Caspian Sea, with the oil minister, Guliam Reza Agazadeh, 
declaring, "Iran will be guided by economic expedience and not political 
conjuncture in solving problems about utilising Caspian oil and gas fields."110 
Besides this, the Iranian government also took the initiative of creating the 
Caspian Sea Organisation (CSO) which aimed to be a mechanism for solving 
the common issues of Caspian littoral states.111 Despite some apparent success 
in beginning to address ecological questions (as part of a project sponsored by 
the UN) such as pollution and the rising water level,112 agreement over the 
fundamental issue - rights' utilisation of the sea's mineral reserves - has 
remained impossible to achieve and the CSO has been left largely defunct. 
 
Complicating the issue has been the position taken up by the government of 
Turkmenistan. In late January 1997, Turkmen officials laid claim to part of the 
oilfields being developed by the AIOC consortium. They said that the Azeri 
field and part of the Chirag field belonged to Turkmenistan.113 This 
disagreement seems to have been over the demarcation of the boundary 
between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan rather than arising from a different view 
of the Sea's status. Thus the Turkmen claim was rejected by Russia whose view 
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was that the fields were no more the property of Turkmenistan than they were 
of Azerbaijan.114 Turkmenistan has both agreed with Russia and Iran on the 
joint development of the Caspian's resources and also with Kazakhstan and 
Azerbaijan recognising separate development rights over the sea.115 
Turkmenistan is very vulnerable to Russian pressure - its impoverished 
economy was brought to a virtual halt after Russia stopped Turkmen gas 
flowing to Western Europe116 - the Turkmens are obliged not to step too far 
from the Russian line on the question of the Caspian's status. 
 
On the other hand, the position of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan was set out in no 
uncertain terms by Vyacheslav Gizzatov, the Kazakh deputy foreign minister: 
"The Caspian Sea should be recognised as a sea, territorial waters determined 
and put under the provisions of the International Law of the Sea."117 While, 
according to Natik Aliyev, president of SOCAR, Russia's failure to distribute 
profits from Caspian oil to Iran during the Soviet era, and Iran's failure to claim 
them, severely damages their present claim that the Caspian's mineral resources 
must now be shared.118 
 
Support has also been gained, as predicted, from the Western governments 
whose oil companies are closely involved in the extraction of Azeri oil. The 
most important of these allies has been the US. Glen Rase, director of 
international energy policy at the US State Department, proclaimed that the 
Russian view, "cannot be imposed on those states that prefer a more normal 
division of the Caspian," that "each of the countries in the region has the right 
to develop its own economic resources according to its own best interests," and 
added a vague threat: "there should be no misunderstanding of this point, the 
United States will defend our companies' interests in the Caspian."119 
 
In response to such veiled threats, even the hard-line faction within the Russian 
government has shown signs of pragmatism. Indeed, alongside the same 
protestations over the illegitimacy of the Caspian oil contracts, there have 
                                                          
114 Interfax, 21 February 1997. 
115 Europe Energy, 20 November 1996; Reuters, 27 February 1997. 
116 Reuters, 30 January 1997. 
117 Quoted in the Financial Times, 3 March 1995. 
118 N. Aliyev, "State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic: Current Developments," 
Azerbaijan International, vol. 2, no. 4, Autumn 1994. 
119 Quoted in the Financial Times, 3 March 1995. 
 
 
? ? CMEIS 58 
 
 
 
 29 
always been allusions that such disputes could easily be solved, if an agreement 
favourable to Russia were reached over the issue of oil transportation routes. 
Retracting his earlier position on the status of the Caspian, Russian energy 
minister Yuri Shafranik stated in November 1994 what has been Russian policy 
on this issue ever since, namely that Russia is "obliged" to take part in all 
energy projects undertaken in the Caspian basin. Using the model of one of the 
largest gas fields in Kazakhstan where the Russian Gazprom monopoly holds a 
15 per cent share (and for which it has omitted to pay),120 Shafranik rather 
unsubtly suggested a solution to the question of the Caspian Sea's status: 
 
The example of the Karachaganak field shows that we come back to this 
point; we have to work jointly in this kind of project ... it's all connected 
to the issues of pipelines and the use of energy.121 
 
The involvement of the Russian company Lukoil in Caspian Sea projects is 
thus seen as the price of gaining at least tacit Russian permission for continued 
exploitation of the sea's mineral stocks. AIOC president Terry Adams suggests 
that "the participation of companies from a variety of nations should facilitate 
our relations with their respective governments."122 According to Susan 
Whitbread, director of management consulting at MAI Consultants which has 
worked on this issue, "the substantial presence of Lukoil in Azerbaijan is 
regarded as silent approval of the signed agreements by the Russian 
government. As a result, such problems as the Caspian Sea's status - although 
they remain on the agenda - have lost some of their acuteness."123 
 
Indeed this particular problem is likely to remain on the agenda. Russia seems 
unlikely to win the legal argument over the Caspian and, after the debacle of 
Chechnya, is probably unwilling and unable to attempt to impose its view. 
Moreover, while Azerbaijan is willing to award shares in the major oil 
contracts to Russia and, to a lesser extent, to Iran, these countries are also 
unlikely to let the issue drop since this would mean a lessening of their 
leverage and possibly an end to their participation in future projects. This 
participation is due largely to their political clout rather than to purely 
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commercial considerations. The present status quo is therefore likely to 
continue. 
 
The Pipeline Issue 
 
The other major issue which similarly involves the overlap of commercial, 
political, geopolitical and practical decision-making has been the question of 
the transportation of the oil to world markets. Azerbaijan's landlocked location 
means that it must rely on neighbouring states in order to convey not just its oil 
but also all it goods to these markets. By the same count, Azerbaijan is thus 
largely reliant upon these same states for the importation of goods from the 
outside world. The ability of regional states to inhibit the passage of goods 
through Azerbaijan's borders, but most importantly, to block the flow of oil to 
markets, constitutes a major source of leverage for those states and a major 
potential impediment to the achievement of economic development and 
independence for Azerbaijan. By the same count, the enormous potential 
earnings to be gained in the form of transit rents on Azeri oil by regional states 
enables Azerbaijan to exert a certain counter-influence by its choice of transit 
route. The problem for Azerbaijan is that there are few such routes available 
and that none of the available routes is free from potential pitfalls. 
 
As the existing mechanisms for exporting Azeri oil, either through the existing 
Soviet era pipeline network, or by rail-tanker, are inadequate for expected 
future flows, the most efficient method of transportation would be through new 
pipelines. The closest exits to the open sea are by the Black Sea, the 
Mediterranean Sea and the Persian Gulf, and these, in the most basic terms, are 
the three alternative export routes. The pipeline solution for Azerbaijan, 
however, is also tied to a regional solution for oil exports, especially those of 
Kazakhstan. Finding a solution to this problem has involved beating a path 
through the minefield of complexities of Azerbaijan's tangled international 
relations, and it is a question which remains to be fully answered, though a 
partial temporary settlement, but not a solution, has been found. 
 
In purely practical terms, by far the easiest solution would be to link up to the 
existing Iranian pipeline network which connects with the Gulf and extends as 
far as Tabriz in Iranian Azerbaijan. At present this route is unacceptable due to 
the large American involvement in the major Azeri oil projects and the US 
government's certain veto of any such deal. Although often dismissed out of 
hand, this route has the advantage of proximity to the Far Eastern markets 
which are predicted to be so important in the next century, and while for the 
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moment the US veto on this route is in force, neither it, nor the conditions 
which have led to its imposition (the nature of the Iranian regime) need 
continue indefinitely; a change in either condition could quickly lead to the 
Iranian route as the preferred choice for the export of Caspian energy 
resources. 
 
The route to the Mediterranean has long been a favoured option amongst 
certain sectors of Azeri opinion. Under the strongly pro-Turkish premier 
Elchibey an agreement was signed with Turkey in March 1993 to build a 
pipeline from Baku to the Turkish Mediterranean port of Ceyhan.124 The 
pipeline would have entered Turkey via the enclave of Nakhichevan after 
following the line of the Iranian border from Baku, made a brief excursion into 
Iranian territory to avoid Armenia and been over 1,000 kilometres long.125 The 
major difficulty with this route is that it must pass through Turkish territory 
which, since 1984, has been subject to widespread violence by the Kurdish 
separatist movement, the PKK. Turkish ministers point out, however, that 
pipelines from Turkey's own oilfields around Batman and the dual pipeline 
from Iraq's Kirkuk fields have operated in the same area with little difficulty.126 
This particular option was, in any case, soon invalidated after Armenian forces 
overran the Iranian border areas in the weeks following the agreement. The 
subsequent fall of Elchibey and rise to power of Haydar Aliyev were seen in 
Turkey as a major blow to their Azerbaijan policy.127 But Aliyev's overtures to 
Russia and seeming disregard for Turkish aspirations had more to do with 
economic and political realities than with a sea-change in foreign policy. 
Aliyev explained, 
 
In 1993 when I came to office as President, they brought me a letter; a 
treaty ... Before any oil production had begun, before any petroleum 
contract had been signed, they'd prepared a treaty. Underneath it had 
fifteen signatures. The leaders had signed it too. It said, 'The pipeline 
will pass through Turkey' ... I'm sorry, but if there is no agreement 
about oil extraction and no production, to announce where the pipeline 
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is going to go is pointless. This was a piece of paper with neither legal 
nor economic foundation.128 
 
At the same time, pressure was being applied over the status of the Caspian 
Sea; a blockade was imposed by Russia on its borders with Azerbaijan129 and 
Russia seemed to be linking this question to a solution in its favour over 
pipeline routes - that is, one which would pass through Russia and not Turkey. 
Vagit Alekperov, president of the Russian oil company, Lukoil (but, 
interestingly, born in Baku), insisted that a pipeline to the northern Black Sea 
port of Novorossiysk was the most economic and secure.130 
 
The "northern route", as it is known, has a number of advantages as an export 
solution for Azeri oil. First is that it would utilise an existing pipeline built 
during the Soviet era; second is consequent lower cost. The drawbacks are that 
the pipeline is badly deteriorated and not functional in places.131 What is more, 
the pipeline was built to carry oil to refineries around Baku from fields further 
north, so the pipeline and pumping stations along the way would have to be 
refurbished to "reverse the flow", an operation said to cost US$16-18 
million.132 
 
More important than the extra expense that such complications entail is the 
passage of the pipeline through Grozny, capital city of the troubled Russian 
Federation Republic of Chechnya. Chechnya unilaterally declared 
independence in 1991, but faced invasion by Russian forces seeking to halt the 
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breakaway in early December 1994.133 Many have argued that the timing of the 
military action by Russian Federation forces in Chechnya was not unconnected 
with the "contract of the century", signed in Baku two and a half months 
earlier.134 During the Russian intervention in Chechnya there were constant 
threats from the Chechen side to the effect that, "without Chechnya's consent, 
the pipeline will not operate."135 
 
Well might these threats be taken seriously. There have been numerous attacks 
on oil and gas pipelines by the rebels in Chechnya and neighbouring Dagestan 
and the Lenin oil refinery in Grozny has also been set ablaze.136 Against this, 
Russian officials point out: "if the Chechen fighters want to attack a pipeline, 
they can attack one outside Chechnya as easily as one inside Chechnya" and 
"the Chechens understand that the pipeline is their chicken which lays golden 
eggs; no one butchers such a chicken."137 While this may be true, pilfering the 
eggs remains another option; during the period between late 1991 and late 
1994, it is estimated that up to 15 million tonnes of oil "went astray" in the 
Chechen pipeline system.138 This process is indeed ongoing, with numerous 
illegal valves and taps being made into the pipeline throughout Chechnya, 
leading to small refineries making low quality petrol.139 In August 1996, 
Nikolai Koshman, the then prime minister of Chechnya's Moscow-installed 
government, stated in a press conference that the pipeline had been disabled 
due to such activities and that an incredible "one hundred and forty-nine secret 
mini-refineries have been found in the past two weeks alone."140 
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Asian Maskhadov's victory in the Chechen presidential elections on 26 January 
1997 may offer the chance of stability in the troubled republic, vital to the 
movement of oil through its territory. Maskhadov has said that oil would move 
safely through Chechnya, though at a price. "We will ensure the safety of the 
oil pipelines, for a certain percentage. We think we should make a profit from 
any transportation of oil or gas, Maskhadov said.141 The matter of Chechenya’s 
share in the route's transit fees, however, will be decided between the Chechens 
and the Russians. "Under our agreement with the Russian Federation, we turn 
over custody of the oil at the border and they give it back to us at Novorossiisk 
... in the light of day, it's in their interest to see this work," said AIOC 
spokesman Greg Rich.142 
 
Once the oil has reached Novorossiysk, however, it must be transported by ship 
in order to reach its presumed Western markets. Here arises the second major 
difficulty with the northern route: the question of the navigation of the 
Bosphorous and Dardanelles straits, linking the Black Sea to the 
Mediterranean. Particularly hazardous is the Bosphorous strait passing through 
the city of Istanbul, which, though nineteen miles long, is only half a mile wide 
in places and subject to widely variable currents. Increased traffic, particularly 
of oil tankers, could pose a threat to the 12 million or so inhabitants of Istanbul, 
as well as provoke extreme ecological concerns in the event of a possible 
accident. 
 
Passage through the Bosphorous and Dardanelles straits is governed by the 
Convention of Montreux of 1936. The Convention allows for complete 
freedom of transit and navigation for merchant vessels of all nations in time of 
peace and war (unless the war is with Turkey).143 Vessels are not even obliged 
to request the assistance of tugs or pilots if they do not wish to do so. The 
predicament was amply illustrated on 13 March 1994 when an oil tanker 
collided with a cargo ship in the Bosphorous to the north of Istanbul with the 
loss of nineteen lives.144 This accident coincided with negotiations over the 
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route of Caspian pipelines and was immediately used by the Turkish 
government to back its case for a route to Ceyhan, bypassing the Turkish 
straits. Some regulation of traffic was then instituted by Turkish authorities 
covering the entry of large vessels and those of limited manoeuvrability, 
subject to currents, visibility, traffic density and the like.145 
 
The Russian government responded with protests that the new regulations were 
contrary to the terms of the Montreux Convention and international law, and 
began negotiations with its "historic partner", Greece, for another pipeline from 
the Bulgarian town of Burgas to Alexandropolis in northern Greece, bypassing 
the Turkish straits and Turkey altogether.146 Despite the protestations of Russia 
and other neighbouring countries whose craft frequently use the straits, the new 
regulations remain in force. 
 
Although the collision of March 1994 suited Turkey's pipeline politics, moves 
to revise the regulation of traffic in the straits and calls for a rescheduling of the 
Montreux Convention pre-date this event. There is also a good objective case 
for re-negotiating the convention. Traffic has increased from about 4,500 ships 
a year with a net tonnage of 7.5 million in 1938, to 24,100 ships and 105.5 
million in 1985.147 Meanwhile, the number of accidents has been rising from 
three collisions and three groundings in 1982, to 14 collisions, two grounding 
and two outbreaks of fire in 1994.148 
 
Once the Turkish plans no longer included Iran as part of the pipeline route, 
but instead proposed to convey the oil either through Armenia or Georgia and 
thence onto Ceyhan and the Mediterranean, the US government also weighed 
in with its support for the Turkish thesis. The Americans believed that by 
channelling the pipeline through Armenia, the large sums of money involved 
might be enough to persuade the two sides in the conflict of the value of peace 
in Nagorno-Karabagh.149 With no sign of any desire for peace there, Azeri and 
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Turkish opposition to this proposal effectively left the route through Georgia as 
the only alternative to Novorossiysk. With such delicate negotiations on the 
agenda there was a further coup attempt against Haydar Aliyev in March 
1995,150 but on this occasion several Turkish citizens were implicated in the 
plot. Aliyev was further enraged when the Turkish prime minister, Tansu 
Çiller, used an increase in TPAO's shares in AIOC to make political headway 
in Turkey and presumed that this meant the Turkish case for building the 
pipeline to Ceyhan was already won. Aliyev, in a show of strength, then 
reportedly telephoned Süleyman Demirel, the Turkish president, threatening to 
cancel the share increase unless Çiller travelled to Baku to sign the deal 
personally, which she was then forced to do.151 
 
The inconsistency and instability of Turkish policy did nothing to help its 
cause. Between 1992 and 1995, Turkey changed its foreign minister no fewer 
than seven times. As Ceyhan then became increasingly unlikely to be chosen as 
the destination for early oil, Turkish interests began to give support to an 
alternative route through Georgia, believing that this would eventually 
inevitably lead to its extension to Ceyhan as "main oil" came on stream. 
 
A report by the US company Brown & Root in April 1995, however, pointed 
out that if instead of the Georgian Black Sea port of Batumi (which is already 
connected to the pipeline network), the pipeline were routed to Supsa further 
up the coast, it would be possible to build a new oil terminal with a greater 
capacity. Despite warnings from BOTAS, the Turkish state pipeline company, 
that this greater capacity could invalidate the need for the route to be extended 
to Ceyhan,152 Turkish ministers then proceeded to support the latter route to 
Supsa and even offered to pay for its construction. What is more, when the 
minister responsible, Emre Gönensay, sent official confirmation of this offer to 
AIOC, having added the condition to the financing that the capacity at Supsa 
be kept to a minimum (to protect the Turkish straits), he then neglected to add 
the intended condition that the pipeline be later extended to Ceyhan. 
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Apparently he forgot!153 When this final condition was added, the Turkish offer 
was rejected.154 
 
Terry Adams, AIOC president, then announced that the choice had been 
narrowed down to either the Russian or the Georgian route for early oil. The 
route to Ceyhan was, for the time being at least, out of the running.155 The 
Azeri government then came under increased pressure. The border with Russia 
was still closed, one million Azeri citizens were still refugees and the economy 
was facing crisis. Not selecting the Russian "northern route" could mean an 
intensification of Russian protests over the status of the Caspian Sea, whereas 
choosing this course could lead to de facto recognition of Azerbaijan's rights 
over its sector of the Sea. Then there was the conflict with Armenia; although a 
cease-fire had held for more than a year, Russia could easily rekindle passions 
if it so chose. To counter these compulsive arguments, Turkish prime minister 
Tansu Çiller threatened to summon the environmental protest group 
Greenpeace to the Bosphorous and cautioned, "not a drop of oil will pass 
through the Bosphorous," if the Georgian route were not chosen. But, 
somewhat illogically, if the Georgian route, or both routes, were chosen, then 
this same oil would be allowed to pass.156 The Russian state oil pipeline 
company Transneft, furthermore, offered to undercut the Georgian tariffs by at 
least 20 per cent and the Russian government signed a protocol guaranteeing to 
substitute Russian crude for any Azeri oil "lost" in transit.157 
 
Such irresistible persuasion from Russia and the inconsistency and illogical 
threats coming from Turkey, added to the lower cost of the "northern route" 
(US$50 million compared with US$275 million for the "western" Georgian 
route), made the decision of the Azeri government and AIOC much easier. 
Since the western route would take longer to construct anyway, a decision on it 
could even be left to a later date. With this in mind, AIOC reportedly prepared 
to announce its choice of a single pipeline to the north. Only last minute 
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telephone calls between Tansu Çiller and US president, Bill Clinton, and 
Clinton’s subsequent intervention with the Azeri president secured the 
selection of both the Russian and Georgian pipeline routes.158 In a 25-minute 
telephone conversation with Haydar Aliyev, Clinton is said to have "expressed 
his support for commercial viability ... and multiple pipelines that would 
benefit the companies investing in oil development as well as the countries of 
the region."159 
 
The decision, announced in early October 1995, to utilise two pipeline routes, 
however, concerned only the export of "early oil". It is envisaged that new 
pipelines will be built to carry the "main oil", which should begin to flow early 
next century. The decision on the later pipeline(s) will depend on the 
experience of operating the first and on geopolitical developments in the 
region. According to John Browne, managing director of BP exploration, if 
difficulties occur, risks can be minimised by "pacing investment according to 
the means of getting the oil out."160 Similarly, AIOC president Terry Adams 
maintains that "both pace and timing (of investment) will emerge as regional 
export solutions fall into place."161 
 
So while this decision on the "dual-pipeline" approach will have a great deal of 
bearing on the course of future export routes, it does not reflect any actual 
commitment to build pipelines for "main oil" along the same routes. 
 
In many ways, the contest among regional players to gain pipelines over their 
territory is not yet complete. The same factors which influenced the earlier 
struggle will come into play in the conflict for routes for "main oil", only then 
these regional powers will also have to prove their goodwill by co-operating 
with the export of early oil. Following the announcement of the oil route 
decision, Terry Adams declared, "as we see it now, Ceyhan will be the eventual 
exit point for the main pipeline."162 It is thought that in the meantime the US 
government is working hard to bring about the passage of this pipeline through 
Armenia. 
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A network of pipelines extending throughout the region, it is hoped, would 
bring greater integration of national interests in the area and the lessening of 
ethnic tensions. Steve Remp, chairman of oil services company Ramco, 
expresses the common view of those involved in the oil industry in Azerbaijan, 
saying, "what you will see in due course is that the issue will turn from being a 
liability to being a very positive generator of income for the area."163 Enhanced 
wealth could then lead to increased stability and an exit from the cycle of 
tension and violence into one of prosperity and development. 
 
 
? ? 
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PART THREE 
NEIGHBOURS 
 
 
The presence of oil in Azerbaijan so far, however, has been a mixed blessing. 
As well as attracting the attention of the world's major oil companies, the 
energy reserves of the Caspian have attracted the sometimes unwelcome 
attention of outside powers, in particular the historic regional rivals: Iran, 
Turkey and Russia. The three Caucasian states of Armenia, Georgia and 
Azerbaijan share the geopolitical fate of being squeezed between these ex-
imperial powers, but their relations also possess an internal dynamic entirely 
their own. In order for Azerbaijan's oil resources to be effectively exploited, 
internal stability is first of all a necessity, but because of its essentially 
landlocked status, Azerbaijan must also rely on the stability of its close 
neighbours. The development of the oil industry is thus affected by regional 
relations as well as being a factor in forming them. 
 
In an ethnic patchwork such as the Caucasus, one of the major challenges to 
stability is that posed by inter-ethnic conflict and ethno-nationalist movements. 
Ethnic conflicts such as that in Nagorno-Karabagh, but also in Chechnya, 
Abkhazia and in south-eastern Turkey, have had grave destabilising 
consequences for the region and have handicapped Azerbaijan's attempt to 
develop economically through its energy reserves. Such conflagrations can 
draw in regional powers but may also be deliberately inflamed by them as 
foreign policy instruments. Although the root cause of these rivalries and 
ancient hatreds perhaps has little to do with the effect of oil, the impact and 
prospect of immense wealth could also easily lend such tensions an explosive 
edge. 
 
The Caucasian Triangle: Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia 
 
(1) Armenia 
 
Of all the potentially damaging regional conflicts that in Nagorno-Karabagh 
involving Armenia is, for Azerbaijan, without doubt the worst. Armenia has 
traditionally been viewed as Russia's partner in the region and for historical 
reasons harbours deep grudges against Turkey and Turkic nations such as 
Azerbaijan. While the Armenian government scrupulously denies any 
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territorial ambitions over Nagorno-Karabagh, the fact that it is now controlled 
by Armenians and not Azeri Turks is regarded as perhaps their greatest national 
achievement.164 
 
Hostilities between ethnic Armenians and Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-
Karabagh enclave left the Armenian forces, widely supported by Armenia 
proper, controlling the Karabagh and large swathes of Azeri territory outside 
the province. Entrenched opinion and political instability at home rendered 
concession on the issue impossible for both Haydar Aliyev and Armenian 
president Levon Ter Petrossian. 
 
With stalemate on the battlefield, signs of moderation have crept into the 
stances of both leaders. Ter Petrossian moved to ban the extremist Armenian 
Revolutionary Federation or Dashnak party in January 1996, branding it a 
"terrorist and fascist organisation".165 The Dashnaks, largely from the 
Armenian diaspora, had demanded the suspension of all ties with Turkey until 
that country recognised its responsibility for the massacres of Armenians in the 
early part of the century - something Turkish governments have refused to do 
for eighty years. The important Armenian lobby in the US from which the 
Dashnaks gain much support, was also behind Senator Bob Dole's 
"Humanitarian Aid Corridor Bill" which threatened to reduce aid to Turkey 
unless it allowed humanitarian assistance to Armenia to be shipped through its 
borders.166 In contrast Terri Petrossian has been trying to mend relations with 
Ankara in order to gain relief from the effects of the double blockade from 
Turkey and Azerbaijan. Recent policy shifts by the Armenian government 
indicate a willingness to achieve a rapprochement with Turkey which some 
observers put down to eagerness to have the pipeline for main oil pass over its 
territory and US pressure to bring this about.167 
 
 
 
 
(2) Georgia 
 
                                                          
164 The Financial Times, 7 June 1995. 
165 Ibid. 
166 Briefing, 20 February 1995. 
167 Zavtra, 17 April 1996; Vek, 29 April 1996; Briefing, 27 February 1995. 
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Of these adjoining states, Georgia has also experienced extensive interference 
from Russia in its internal affairs since independence, as well as a number of 
coup attempts, virtual civil war and separatist movements in the provinces of 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Blame for the successful breakaway of these 
regions has often been heaped on Moscow, and it is difficult to realise how the 
Abkhaz, who constitute less than 20 per cent of the population of their titular 
province,168 might have otherwise succeeded in splitting from the rest of 
Georgia. With few natural resources of it own, Georgia's position as a vital 
conduit for goods between Turkey, the Russian Federation, Armenia and 
Azerbaijan has seen it maintain cordial relations with all of these. In turn, its 
capacity to transport oil from Azerbaijan to the Black Sea is seen as one of the 
country's major geostrategic advantages.169 Shared experience and coincidence 
of interests have led to the formation of close relations with Azerbaijan. These 
ties were formally consolidated during a recent visit to Georgia by Haydar 
Aliyev, during which 14 separate agreements were signed covering trade and 
economic collaboration as well as a Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and 
Strengthening Mutual Security.170 This last agreement hinted at settlement of 
the dispute in Nagorno-Karabagh through a policy of rigorous respect for 
territorial integrity - that is, no deals with separatists. Speaking of relations 
between the Caucasian states, Aliyev hoped that this agreement might mark the 
beginnings of "a new form of alliance between the three republics, which are 
no longer drawn into the political games of 'third countries'."171 
 
Also signed during the same visit was an agreement between the two states, 
their respective oil companies and AIOC concerning the transportation of early 
oil through Georgia. It was agreed that the pipeline costing about US$ 275 
million would be financed by AIOC with tariffs set at 43 (US) cents per barrel 
(26 cents of which would accrue to Azerbaijan and 17 cents to Georgia).172 
This agreement, more than any other, has set the seal on Azeri-Georgian 
relations. Moreover, Haydar Aliyev, after the signing, went on to stress the 
                                                          
168 According to the 1989 census, Abkhaz citizens made up 17.3 per cent of the 
population of the Abkhaz ASSR, (P.B. Henze, op. cit., pp. 153). 
169 See The Guardian, 22 February 1997. 
170 Svobodnaia Gruziia, Tbilisi, 9 March 1996; The Commonwealth of Independent 
States and the Middle East, vol. 21, no. 3-4, 1996, pp. 37-8. 
171 Bakinskii Rabochii, Baku, 14 March 1996; The Commonwealth of Independent States 
and the Middle East, vol. 21, no. 3-4, 1996, pp. 38. 
172 Ibid.; Jamestown Monitor, 11 March 1996. 
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importance of the pipeline for relations between Azerbaijan, Georgia and 
Turkey - a further link in the already busy trade between the three.173 The 
political importance of the oil route for Georgia is indeed a greater 
consideration than the financial aspect. The state oil concern, the Georgian 
International Oil Corporation (GIOC), estimates that earnings from the pipeline 
will amount to only US$8 million a year; the low tariffs are to enable AIOC to 
recover the cost of its construction, while the Georgian government will have 
to wait eight and a half years before it can demand a revision of the fees.174 For 
Georgii Chanturiia, president of GIOC, the main advantage of the project is 
that "Georgia will obtain a more important geopolitical role."175 
 
The Regional Powers: Iran, Turkey and Russia 
 
Squeezed between the three ex-imperial powers of Iran, Turkey and Russia, 
Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia have a great deal in common. In contrast to 
its neighbours, however, Azerbaijan is also intimately linked with all three: 
linguistically with Turkey; religiously with Iran and historically with Russia. 
Each of these large neighbours then believes that it has a keen interest in 
Azerbaijan. They are Azerbaijan's three biggest trading partners.176 An 
independent Azerbaijan must succeed in reconciling these concerns with it own 
best interests and seek to find a regional balance whereby the regional powers 
may reconcile their differences with each other. 
 
 
 
 
(1) Iran 
 
                                                          
173 Bakinskii Rabochii, Baku, op. cit. (1996); The Commonwealth of Independent States 
and the Middle East, vol. 21, no. 3-4, 1996, pp. 38. 
174 New Europe, 25-31 August 1996. 
175 Kommersant-Daily; The Commonwealth of Independent States and the Middle East, 
vol. 21, no. 3-4, 1996, pp. 39. 
176 Zerkalo, 28 October 1995; The Commonwealth of Independent States and the Middle 
East, vol. 20, no. 10-11, 1995. 
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The vast majority of Azeris (some 78 per cent), like Iranians, are adherents of 
the Shia branch of the Muslim faith.177 Iran's relations with Azerbaijan are 
complicated by the presence of some 10 million ethnic Azeris who live in the 
neighbouring provinces of northern Iran. Although the inhabitants of what 
Azeris north of the border like to call "southern Azerbaijan" have long had a 
separate existence from those in the north (since 1828), the Iranian regime 
remains quite sensitive to this issue. 
 
When protesters from Nakhichevan broke down the border with Iran, 
contacting Azeris on the other side in late 1989, they were met largely with 
bemusement by the local population.178 Nevertheless, as the conflict in 
Nagorno-Karabagh intensified, Iranian leaders were alarmed at Turkish 
reactions to it which called for ethnic and linguistic solidarity between Turkey 
and Azerbaijan. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei preferred to see the shadow of 
America behind the conflict and warned that it would be "a big blunder to think 
that ethnic and national motives are behind this move."179 
 
Disturbed by developments north of the border, Iran has been instrumental in 
moves to bring about peace in Karabagh.180 Despite this neutrality, however, 
there remains the deep suspicion in Azerbaijan that Iran has sided with 
Armenia in the dispute for fear of Azeri irredentism and reasons of geopolitical 
self-interest. With Armenia suffering a double blockade from both Turkey and 
Azerbaijan, its only access points were Georgia and Iran. As supplies through 
Georgia were also threatened by local conflicts, Iran began increasingly to 
supply Armenia's needs. A proposed gas pipeline from Iran is viewed by the 
Armenians as their best hope of escaping the worst of the blockade and Iran 
has become second only to Russia among Armenia's trading partners.181 
 
                                                          
177 A. Ehteshami, "New Frontiers: Iran, the GCC and the CCARs," in A. Ehteshami 
(ed.), op. cit., pp. 99. 
178 T. Swietochowski, op. cit., (1995), pp. 209-10. 
179 Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Near East and South Asia, 90, January 1990, 
quoted in T. Swietochowski, op. cit., (1995), pp. 208. 
180 A. Ehteshami, and E. Murphy, "The Non-Arab Middle East States and the 
Caucasian/Central Asian Republics: Iran & Israel," International Relations, vol. 20, 
no. 12, pp. 86-87. 
181 The Financial Times, 7 June 1995. 
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Further doubts over Iran's intentions towards Azerbaijan have been aroused by 
the perceived informal alliance between Iran and Russia in the Caucasus and 
Central Asia. This is largely due to a coincidence of interests by the two 
countries, particularly over energy issues. Among these, as has been noted, has 
been the clash over the status of the Caspian Sea. In this respect Iran's 
objections were, like those of Russia, tools of policy rather than a principled 
stance, arising only after Iran had been excluded from AIOC because of US 
pressure in early 1995. The inclusion of the Iranian Oil Industries and 
Construction Company in the Shah Deniz project, signed on 4 June 1996, will 
have done much to reduce these objections. Significantly this project involves 
no American organisation, and although publicly US officials object to this 
Iranian involvement, privately they admit to understanding Azeri concerns to 
include Iran in future oil projects in order to give it a vested interest in 
Azerbaijan's future stability. 
 
Iran's potential as a route for exporting Azeri oil can never be entirely ignored. 
Elchibey's government had planned to use Iran for this purpose in its original 
proposal for a pipeline to Ceyhan, and while American objections and 
Armenian battlefield success killed this particular plan, the Iranian route must 
always remain an option. Indeed swap arrangements with Iran are being 
planned with even US companies trying to find loopholes in their government's 
legislation to enable them to profit from this kind of deal.182 Iran's enhanced 
profile in the gas pipeline network stretching from Central Asia to Europe is 
likely to increase its chances of involvement in similar oil pipeline projects. 
 
Iran's fears of a Turkic bloc developing along its northern frontiers has largely 
failed to materialise, as has any desire in "southern Azerbaijan" for unification 
with the north.183 Since the fall of Elchibey, Aliyev's government has done 
much to quell such Iranian fears and engage Iran in Azerbaijan's development, 
particularly with regard to oil. Nevertheless, suspicions remain on both sides. 
Iran objected strongly to a 1992 peace plan for Nagorno-Karabagh which 
would have exchanged the Lachin corridor linking the breakaway province 
with Armenia for a reciprocal link between Nakhichevan and Azerbaijan 
proper. This plan would also have had the effect of awarding Turkey a direct 
land bridge to Azerbaijan and the rest of the Turkic world.184 While Azerbaijan 
                                                          
182 Ibid., 10 May 1995. 
183 Apparently the joke amongst Tabrizis is; "why should we want to join another 
country when we already run the one we're living in now!". 
184 H.Y. Freij, "State Interests Versus the Umma: Iranian Policy in Central Asia," Middle 
East Journal, vol. 50, no. 1, Winter 1996. 
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remains ill at ease over Iran's perceived bias towards Armenia and its clear 
diplomatic co-operation with Russia.185 
 
(2) Turkey 
 
Turkey, meanwhile, has close linguistic links with Azerbaijan. The language 
spoken by Turks and Azeris is quite easily mutually intelligible. Even before 
Azeri independence, Ankara was cementing ties with Baku, hosting visits from 
its leaders and showing moral support and indignation over the issue of 
Nagorno-Karabagh.186 The Turkish press excitedly took up the issue and spoke 
of the "indestructible ties between Azerbaijan and Turkey based on common 
race, language and culture."187 Exclusion from the European arena and loss of a 
diplomatic role due to the end of the cold war, gave the prospect of the rise of 
independent brother nations to the east an added importance in Turkish 
perceptions. 
 
Nowhere was this enthusiasm more intense than in the case of Azerbaijan. 
Turkish policy was quickly assembled around the figure of the strongly pro-
Turkish (and pan-Turkist) President Elchibey. The fall of Elchibey was seen as 
a body blow to Turkish interests in the region and the rise of the seemingly pro-
Russian Aliyev viewed with misgivings.188 
 
These feelings were exacerbated as Aliyev took Azerbaijan back into the CIS, 
cast doubts over the pipeline to Ceyhan, proposed instead a route through 
Russia and then proceeded to award Iran a greater share in AIOC than the 
original 1.75 per cent held by the Turkish TPAO.189 
 
The reassertion of Russian influence in its "near abroad" and the realisation that 
Russia was still a very strong influence in the region, caused a reassessment of 
Turkish strategy in the Caucasus and a more measured approach. Added to this 
was the consideration that trade between Turkey and Russia amounted to over 
                                                          
185 See Ibid., pp. 72-77. 
186 A. Vassiliev, "Turkey and Iran in Caucasian Central Asia," in A. Ehteshami (ed.), op. 
cit., pp. 139. 
187 Quoted in T. Swietochowski, op. cit., (1995), pp. 208. 
188 See Briefing, 14 February 1994; S. Gümeç, "Tarihte ve Günümüzde, Azerbaycan," 
Yeni Forum, August 1993, pp. 30-42. 
189 Briefing, 21 November 1994. 
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US$1,865 million in 1995, but that between Turkey and Azerbaijan was only 
US$17 million for the same period. Turkey is Russia's biggest market in the 
developing world and Russia is Turkey's third biggest trading partner after the 
US and Germany.190 
 
Turkish ambitions in the region are also further weakened by Turkey's physical 
separation from Azerbaijan, except for the province of Nakhichevan,191 hence 
Turkey's enthusiastic backing of the US-sponsored peace plan linking 
Nakhichevan (thus Turkey) to the rest of Azerbaijan.192 To counter this 
physical isolation from Azerbaijan, Turkey has been assiduously cultivating its 
relationship with Georgia, offering to fund oil pipeline and rail links between 
the two countries;193 Turkey now accounts for 32 per cent of Georgia's foreign 
trade.194 Good infrastructure links between Turkey and Georgia are essential if 
Turkey is to benefit from oil projects in Azerbaijan. Common historical 
mistrust of Russia, but mainly mutual desire to gain from the transport of Azeri 
oil has helped cement this relationship. 
 
Reference has already been made to the inconsistency of Turkish policy on 
Azerbaijan due to internal instability. Ankara's saving grace, however, has been 
the vital support of the US government. Having accepted the elimination of 
Ceyhan as an option for early oil, it was the last-minute intervention by the 
Clinton administration which averted total humiliating defeat for Ankara's 
pipeline policy. Together with this policy, US government officials have also 
paved the way for increased Russian acceptance of Turkish involvement in 
regional energy projects.195 So far Turkey has gained little but goodwill from 
an independent Azerbaijan. This goodwill largely arises out of Turkey's support 
                                                          
190 Monthly Bulletin of Statistics of the Prime Ministry of Turkey, January 1996; The 
Commonwealth of Independent States and the Middle East, vol. 20, no. 10-11, pp. 
19. 
191 Turkey was careful to ensure it gained a small corridor to Nakhichevan during Turko-
Iranian border negotiations in 1932. See G.E. Fuller, The Centre of the Universe, 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), pp. 199. 
192 Briefing, 14 March 1994. 
193 Svobodnaia Gruziia, 5 April 1996; The Commonwealth of Independent States and the 
Middle East, vol. 21, no. 34, pp. 64. 
194 Nezavismaia Gazeta, 3 December 1995; The Commonwealth of Independent States 
and the Middle East, vol. 20. no. 12, 1995, pp. 28. 
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over the conflict in Nagorno-Karabagh and its resultant enforcing of an 
embargo on Armenia. Turkish authorities, however, have displayed willingness 
to sacrifice even this policy in the face of US pressure and the prospect of the 
big prize, the elusive pipeline to Ceyhan.196 
 
(3) Russia 
 
Without doubt the greatest influence on Azerbaijan, however, is Russia. 
Although the Soviet Union is now disbanded, "an empire does not die easily, 
especially if it sits astride the geographical centre of the world's land mass and 
the relationship of forces evokes the image of a shark among sardines."197 
Russian interest in its former satellite states resembles that of other 
decolonising powers; Moscow wishes to maintain its strategic concerns and 
economic advantages without the previous economic burdens. Interference by 
outside powers in what was once its exclusive domain is also deeply resented. 
While present circumstances dictate that such intrusion must be tolerated, 
political regimes openly hostile to Moscow, seeking to escape Russian 
geostrategic hegemony or replace it with that of another power, have been 
faced with Russian measures aimed at causing instability. This is especially the 
case in republics rich in oil reserves. 
 
While active Russian involvement in Nagorno-Karabagh is doubtful, Russian 
support for Armenia was vital. As one Azeri politician pointed out, "Russia 
could have stopped the war instantly had it chosen to stop supplies entering 
Armenia."198 Conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia have similarly been 
supported in order to destabilise Georgia. The dispute over the Caspian has also 
been utilised in this vein. Such weapons are particularly effective in gaining 
influence in newly independent states such as Azerbaijan. In recognition of this 
fact, Russia has gained shares in all the major oil production projects in 
Azerbaijan, as it is expected to do so in the future. Independence for Azerbaijan 
is not without its price. 
 
The limit to Russian domination of the region has proved to be Chechnya. That 
the brutal war in the breakaway republic caused major damage to Russian 
designs to provide the eventual route for main oil is without doubt. Even the 
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passage of early oil may now be delayed.199 The rise of nationalism, 
reappearance of communism and the ailments of President Yeltsin make the 
direction of Russian policy on this issue very fluid. What is now certain is that, 
given the experience of Chechnya, Russia is now unlikely to seek a military 
solution to its problems in the Caucasus. It too will have to look to diplomatic 
means to achieve its goals there. 
 
There have been hot-headed statements in the Russian press claiming, "there is 
no doubt that (Turkey's) policy is directed at transforming the country in the 
shortest historical period into a regional superpower controlling the entire 
system of new politico-economic relations in Transcaucasia," and that Turkey 
harbours "neo-Pan-Turkic aspirations".200 But such outbursts are tempered by 
the close trading relationship enjoyed by the two countries mentioned above. 
Turkey is the most favoured destination for Russian tourists who spend an 
estimated US$3-4 million a year there, while Turkish construction firms are 
engaged in contracts in Russia worth an estimated US$4-5,000 million.201 Both 
countries have come to realise that neither can exclusively dominate the 
Caucasus and that countries such as Azerbaijan have now, in any case an 
independent interest which is no longer so malleable to the designs of regional 
actors. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
The position of Azerbaijan astride such vast oil reserves has thus had a 
fundamental influence on its history and development. After becoming the 
world's first oil economy in the mid-nineteenth century, the decline of its oil 
industry under Soviet mismanagement meant the decline of Azerbaijan itself 
and its disappearance from the lexicon of international affairs. Ironically this 
very same mismanagement and technological deficiency of the USSR has 
meant that large oil reserves still remain to be exploited. 
 
Azerbaijan's shaky start to independence was a product of the former 
maladministration, not only because of the economic underdevelopment, but 
also because of the ethnic discord which previous policies ensued. It is correct 
to say that Soviet boundary policy operated by "both recognising subordinate 
nationalities and ethnic groups, and dividing state lines that intentionally cut 
across ethnic and national residential patterns."202 It is this policy which has left 
Azerbaijan with its most dangerous legacy: the conflict in Nagorno-Karabagh. 
This conflict, which is so central to the formation of the independent republic 
and its subsequent history, is also central to Azerbaijan's reasons for needing to 
develop its oil industry and, moreover, to the urgency with which it must 
achieve this end. Azeri oil is not just a tool for enrichment but a means of 
overcoming conflict and finding willing partners with which to form alliances; 
it is thus a means of achieving independence. 
 
Azerbaijan's geographical position, however, precludes an easy progress to full 
oil production. The sudden and unexpected break-up of the Soviet Union has 
meant an entire absence of mechanisms for dealing with important issues such 
as the division and management of resources. Such deficiencies can easily be 
taken advantage of by parties who, for their own reasons, oppose the 
emergence of independent competitor states. The lack of consensus over the 
status of the Caspian Sea is a case of this nature and is an example of 
international law being used to serve national ends, or litigatory diplomacy 
perhaps. On a close examination of the legal arguments it emerges that the case 
for arguing for an equal division of the Caspian's resources is a thin one. Its 
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real significance is that it is put forward by such a powerful neighbour as 
Russia. Since in the past the supreme arbiter on such matters in this region has 
been Russia's military might, smaller adversaries such as Azerbaijan or 
Kazakhstan have good reason to fear an adverse judgement. It appears, 
however, that such an outcome is unlikely. 
 
Russia's present leaders at least are unwilling, and for the moment unable, to 
enforce their view. Although the days of empire are over, Russia is still a 
powerful force in the region and due cognizance must be given of this. More 
than anything, the choice of routes for Azerbaijan's future oil exports will 
establish the future direction of its own relations but also profoundly affect the 
shape of future regional alliances. 
 
The decision on future pipeline routes, for now, instead reflects the present 
alignment of forces. The passage of a major energy pipeline through a 
neighbouring country will entail a large part of those countries' future relations, 
forming an inter-reliance which can be mutually beneficial but which gives 
each an important weapon against the other: the ability to turn the taps off. 
 
As a landlocked producer state Azerbaijan must look to its neighbours to help 
in the export of its energy resources. The problem for Azerbaijan is that all 
these routes must pass through the territory of ex-imperial powers which have 
all at one time controlled its territory; what is more they can be extremely 
jealous of each other. In this situation it does not do to be over reliant on any 
one of these countries for the export of such a vital resource. The contest which 
led to the selection of routes for early oil illustrates some of the forces involved 
in such a decision. 
 
This struggle is likely to be repeated when the question of main oil comes up 
over the next few years. Already, however, even before early oil has begun to 
flow, there has been a re-alignment of forces in the region. The selection of the 
dual-pipeline option has meant that both Turkey and Russia have an interest in 
supporting the stability and peaceful development of an independent 
Azerbaijan. Initial signs of this are already emerging, as demonstrated earlier 
this year when authorities in Moscow arrested and offered to extradite former 
coup leaders Ayaz Mutalibov and Rahim Gaziyev (see Part One), while at the 
same time Ankara vied with them, offering peacekeeping forces for Nagorno-
Karabagh and further help in training Azeri military personnel.203 
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Neither is monopolistic control of pipeline routes beneficial to any party. Both 
Russia and Turkey are victims of fierce secessionist campaigns which could 
easily upset oil exports through their territories. Particularly for Moscow, sole 
control of export routes from Azerbaijan, if they continue to pass through 
Chechnya, would increase the viability of Chechen calls for independence and 
may therefore be likely to increase their intensity, whereas on the other hand, 
just as the fighting in Chechnya was spurred by attempts to control the pipeline, 
the downgrading of its importance by the existence of a secondary pipeline 
might lead to the lessening of hostilities. 
 
This also applies to other conflicts in the region where Russia is increasingly 
backing peace efforts, for example in the breakaway Georgian provinces of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia,204 but also in Nagorno-Karabagh.205 
 
Potential sticking-points in this diplomacy include nations left without a means 
of profiting from Azeri oil and therefore no stake its stability. The most 
obvious of these countries are Armenia and perhaps partially Iran. In Armenia's 
case especial influence in the US can have a powerful effect on US regional 
policy.206 With very few assets aside from this and the possession of Nagorno-
Karabagh, Armenia cannot be expected to trade the latter cheaply. It will be 
very tempting for US policymakers to link peace with the construction of a 
pipeline from Azerbaijan to Turkey through Armenia, thus linking the fates of 
three US allies in the area in the hope that prosperity might ease some of the 
discord between them. In the case of Iran, the US policy of advocating its 
complete exclusion from all oil deals in the Caspian may prove to be a 
dangerous exception. The inclusion of Iran in the Shah Deniz project may go 
some way to rectifying the imbalance between Iran's regional importance and 
its lack of involvement in Azerbaijani oil industry. 
 
In the case of Azerbaijan then, achieving independence has been a case of 
ensuring interdependence among regional states. Despite major difficulties 
such as ethnic strife and the self-interest of local powers, much progress has 
been made towards this goal. Much of this progress is largely due to oil. By 
giving these states an interest and stake in the various projects of the oil 
industry in Azerbaijan, the Azeri government has given them a stake, too, in 
Azerbaijan's future. 
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APPENDIX 1 
 
Table 1.1: AIOC Participating Interests, July 1996* 
Company Name Percentage Interest Country of Origin Percentage Interest
SOCAR 10.0000 Azerbaijan 10.0000
Amoco 17.1000 USA 39.8770
Pennzoil 4.8175
Unocal 10.0489
Exxon 8.0006
BP 17.1267 UK 19.2092
Ramco 2.0825
Lukoil 10.0000 Russia 10.0000
Statoil 8.5633 Norway 8.5633
TPAO 6.7500 Turkey 6.7500
Itochu 3.9205 Japan 3.9205
Delta 1.6800 Saudi Arabia 1.6800
* Source: Agip
Figure 1.1: AIOC Participating Interests by Country, July 1996*
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APPENDIX 2 
 
Table 2.1: Chronology of Major Oil Contracts in Azerbaijan* 
 
Date/Status 
 
Contact Field(s) Contracting Company 
Signed contracts 
 
  
August 1994 Karadag Structure, 
Kergez field 
 
BMB Oil 
20 September 1994 Azeri, Güneshli, 
Chirag fields 
 
Azerbaijan International 
Oil Company 
10 November 1995 Karabagh Structure 
 
LukAgip, Pennzoil, 
Lukoil, SOCAR, Agip 
 
4 June 1996 Shah Deniz field 
 
 
BP, Statoil, TPAO, OIEC, 
Lukoil, Elf Aquitaine 
 
7 June 1996 D-3, D-9/D-38 
Blocks 
 
Exxon 
13 January 1997 Lenkoran Deniz, 
Talysh Deniz fields 
 
Elf Aquitaine, SOCAR, 
Total 
25 February 1997 Dan Ulduzlu, 
Ashrafi fields 
 
Amoco, Unocal, Itochu, 
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Figure 3.1: Participating Interests in the Shah Deniz Project, July 1996* 
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Figure 3.2: Participating Interests in the Karabagh Project, July 1996* 
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